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COHEN UND NATORP  
Helmut Holzhey  
Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co., 1986.  
Volume I; Ursprung und Einheit, xii + 419pp.  
Volume II: Der Marburger Neukantianismus in Quellen, 536pp.  
This detailed study examines the close cooperation between the two main 
figures of the Marburg School, Hermann Cohen (1842-1918) and Paul Natorp 
(18541924), primarily from the time that Natorp came 10 the University of 
Marburg in 1880 to write his Habilitationsschrift under Cohen until Cohen's 
resignation from Marburg in 1912. It is a common view that during this period 
Cohen and Natorp were of one philosophical mind: Cohen developed the basic 
premises of Marburg Kantianism, first in his explications of Kant's three Critiques, 
and later in his own philosophical system [Logic of Pure Cognition (1902), Ethics 
of the Pure Will (1904), and Aesthetics of Pure Feeling (1912)], while Natorp 
used these premises in his historical studies (e.g., on Descartes and Plato) and 
in the construction of his social pedagogy. On this account, it was not until 
Cohen's departure from Marburg, or even not until the latter's death, that Natorp's 
philosophy began to differentiate clearly from Cohen's, taking an increasingly 
metaphysical-mystical turn. Holzhey successfully undermines this view. He 
shows that during Cohen's Marburg period Natorp was actually critical of some 
basic aspects of Cohen's epistemic logic, ethics, and philosophy of religion, but 
that Natorp underplayed his disagreements and largely kept them from becoming 
public.  
To substantiate his thesis, Holzhey first offers in Volume I a detailed 
history of the Marburg School. This exposition makes clear that here are several 
factors that can account for Nalorp's reluctance to publicize his philosophical 
objections to Cohen's system, such as their friendship, Natorp's personal and 
intellectual indebtedness to Cohen, and Cohen's dominant personality (see p. 
36). More importantly, Holzhey's historical exposition (and his study in general) 
brings to ou~ attention the richness and philosophical creativity of Marburg 
Kantianism, not only as displayed in the works of Cohen and Natorp, but also as 
developed by their students Ernst Cassirer, Albert Garland, and Karl Vorlander 
(to mention only a few). This point can hardly be sufficiently stressed; for, as 
Holzhey notes with obvious disapproval, today's Kantian philosopher "prefers to 
toil on the basis of the original Kantian thoughts, often simply out of ignorance of 
neo-Kantian concepts" (p. ix).  
Holzhey next provides a comparative analysis of the views of Cohen and 
Natorp, focussing on their epistemic disagreements. In the course of this analysis 
Holzhey uses various hitherto unpublished materials, such as Natorp's critical 
review of Cohen's Logic of Pure Cognition, which Natorp decided not to submit 
for publication in Kant-Studien after Cohen had objected that it did not 
adequately represent his own viewpoint (see p. 35). These materials, together 
with numerous letters by Cohen and Natorp, can be found in Volume II. (The 
letters necessarily offer a one-sided picture of the dialogue between Cohen and 
Natorp; only some drafts of letters from Natorp to Cohen are extant, as Cohen's 
personal papers were lost when his wife was deported to Theresienstadt.)  
Holzhey's focus on Cohen's and Natorp's epistemic logic, though 
unobjectionable in itself, has at times a distortive effect. For example, Holzhey 
rightly argues that the transcendental method constitutes the "connecting 
element" of the Marburg School (see Volume I, pp. 49 ff.), but what also needs to 
be emphasized is that most Marburg Kantians held that Kant's notion of the 
kingdom of ends sets forth the demand for democratic socialism. In short, the 
Marburg School aspired to be not just an academic force, but also a social-
political force, seeking to correct the dogmatic Marxism of the German Social 
Democratic Party. Likewise, Holzhey deals too hastily with Cohen's ethics in his 
discussion of the interconnectedness of Cohen's system (see Volume 1, Chapter 
X). Holzhey inadequately stresses that Cohen saw not only a methodic unity 
between epistemic logic and ethics, but also maintained in Ethics of the Pure Will 
that both theoretical and practical reason (science and ethics) must aim at the 
unification of natural and moral laws (i.e., "truth"), a postulated possibility that has 
its ultimate ground in the regulative idea of God. Thus it can be argued, more 
emphatically than Holzhey does, that some of Natorp's criticisms of the "weak" 
interconnectedness of Cohen's system are misplaced.  
A short review can hardly do justice to the richness of Holzhey's study: we 
can find in his work a complete bibliography of Cohen's writings, a fascinating 
description of the inner faculty struggles at Marburg, which came to a climax 
when Cohen did not succeed in making Cassirer his successor, as well as 
interesting notes on the failed attempts of the Marburg Kantians to acquire their 
own journal and on their polemic with the editors of Kant-Studien. Also, Holzhey's 
numerous annotations to the letters of Cohen and Natorp offer a wealth of 
information concerning German philosophy around the turn of the century, 
besides being hel pfuJ in exploring Cohen's and Natorp's attitudes to some of the 
main German political figures and events of the lime. All this makes Holzhey's 
study indispensible, both for the Kantian philosopher and the historian of 
Wilhelmian Germany.  
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